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No. 86-279
Cert to CA6 (Martin,
Jones, Wellford)

v.
Timely

Federal/Civil
areholders)

SUMMARY:

Petrs argue:

(1} CA6 erred in holding that "no

corporate development" statements were materially false · and misleadi g; and (2} CA6 erred in affirming the de's certification of
intiff class based on a presumption of reliance.
FACTS

AND

DECISION BELOW:

Petrs

of its officers and directors.

are Basic,

Inc.

and

-

Resps represent a class

of shareholders of Basic who sold Basic common stock between Oc-
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-2tober

21,

1977,

1976,

James

and December

Kelly,

began negotiations

15,

an officer
with

1978.

Beginning

in September

in Combustion Engineering,

officers

of Basic regarding

a

Inc.,

possible

merger/acquisition.

Both company's stock was traded on the New

York Stock Exchange

(NYSE).

end

of

Basic's

1976

and

through

management

met

Negotiations continued through the

1977 and

with

its

1978.

On October

investment

bankers

18,
to

1977,

discuss

preparation of a valuation of Basic to use in the merger negotiations.
on

On October 19 and 20, 1977, the trading volume of Basic

the NYSE

increased from an average of 6, 000 to 8, 000 shares
!1'7 7
per day to 29,000 shares per day.
On October 21, Basic issued,
-1

through petr Muller, its president, the first of five public announcements

that

form

the basis of resps'

action.

Petr Muller

denied that any negotiations were being conducted with respect to
a possible merger.l
During the early part of July 1978, Muller and Kelly agreed
that Kelly would prepare an informal offer for Basic, and Combustion directed its

investment bankers to prepare analyses of ac-

quisi tion prices.

On July 14,

the price of Basic's stock rose

over 3 points on a trading volume of approximately 18,200 shares.

lThe
announcement,
in
The
Cleveland
Plain
published
~~--~--~~~--~~-Dealer, stated:
"President Max Muller said the company knew
no reason for the stock's activity and that no
negotiations were under way with any company for
a merger. He said Flintkote recently denied Wall
Street rumors that it would make a tender offer
of $25 a share for control of [Basic]."

.•

-3A NYSE officer asked a representative of Basic about the unusual
activity

in Basic stock

and Basic

again denied that there were

any undisclosed merger or acquisition plans or other significant
corporate developments.
On September 14, Combustion directed its investment bankers
to prepare and deliver to Kelly a draft proposal letter for the
acquisition

of

Basic.

On September

25-26,

the

price of

Basic

stock increased a total of almost 5 points on a daily volume of
over 28,000 shares per day.

A NYSE officer again contacted Basic

and inquired whether there were any undisclosed merger or acquisition

plans,

any

developments

relating

to

offer, or any other corporate developments.
were no such developments.

a

possible

tender

Basic stated there

Basic's president, Muller, when ap-

----,

pr ised of

the NYSE' s

inquiries,

issued a

press

release denying

the existence of any merger/acquisition negotiations.2
The
the

first

contacts

between

the

week of November,

two companies continued.

Basic denied,

for

the fourth

During
time,

that there were any developments that would account for the increased activity in its stock.3

On November 27, Kelly met with

2The release stated:
"[M] anagement is unaware of any present or
pending corporate development that would result
in the abnormally heavy trading activity and
price fluctuation in company shares that have
been experienced in the past few days."

~

3 This denial was contained in Basic's "Nine Month Interim
Report to Shareholders." This report stated:
"With regard to the stock market activity in
the Company's shares we remain unaware of any
present or
pending developments which would
(Footnote continued)

..

-4Muller and others from Basic and discussed an all cash price of
$35 per share, which Basic rejected.
ing

the

next

Combustion's

two

weeks,

executive

Basic at $46 per share.

Negotiations continued dur-

culminating on December

commit tee

approving

a

14,

tender

1978 with

offer

for

On December 15, Basic's stock price in-

creased dramatically and, for a fifth time, Basic denied the existence of any corporate developments when queried by the NYSE.
Basic requested

that the NYSE suspend trading its shares on De-

cember 18, and on December 19, Basic accepted Combustion's offer.
Resps

filed

an

action

- - - - - - --.

in

de

alleging

-

that

petrs'

various

·---

statements denying the existence of merger discussions were false
------,
and misleading in violation of sect ion 10 (b) of the Securities

~------------~
of 19 3 4 and Rule 1 Ob- 5.
Re sps claimed they sus-

Exchange Act
tained

substantial

ments and
price.

losses

s ~their

because

they

relied on petrs'

state-

shares of Basic stock at an artificially low

The de (ED Ohio, Thomas [sdj]) certified a class consist-

ing of all parties who so1d Basic stock during the merger negotiations'
relied

time
upon

period,
petrs'

applying

a presumption

statements.

Following

that

these parties
the

discovery,

~

de

granted petrs' motion for summary judgment after finding that the
statements,

as a matter of law, were not material and

that the

petrs did not act with scienter.

(Footnote 3 continued from previous page)
account for the high volume of trading and price
fluctuations in recent months."

.·

-5s~
On cross-appeals to CA6, the court reversed the award of SJ,
1\

_____________,to the de for furaffirmed the class certification, and remanded
ther

proceedings.

petrs had an

CA6

noted

that

it need

not

address

initial affirmative duty to disclose

whether

the contacts

If a corporation is not under

and negotiations with Combustion.

a duty to disclose certain information, but voluntarily makes a
statement

" 1 calculated

to

influence

the

investing

public 1

the

corporation then has a duty to disclose sufficient information so
that

the

statement made

is not

incomplete as to mislead.

1

"

1

false

Petn App lOa

Gulf Sulfur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 862

u.s.

976 {1969)).

discussions
knowledge

so

{quoting SEC v. Texas

{CA2 1968), cert. denied, 394

Petrs 1 duty to clarify and disclose the merger

arose

of

or misleading or

only

because

"present or

pending

of

petrs

1

statements

denying

corporate developments."

The

petrs had a duty to be truthful and the record clearly shows that
the denials were misleading, if not completely false.

CA6 relied

on First Virginia Bankshares v. Benson, 559 F.2d 1307, 1317

u.s.

1977), cert. denied, 435
duty to speak

952

(CAS

(1978): Under Rule lOb-S, "[a]

the full truth arises when a defendant undertakes

to say anything."
CA6 determined
were material.

that

the

facts petrs neglected

to disclose

Applying the test of materiality articulated in

TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426

u.s.

438

(1976), CA6

concluded that the reasonable investor, having been informed that
petrs were aware of no corporate developments that would cause
the

increased

activity

in Basic

stock

on

the NYSE,

would have

thought that the disclosure of the merger negotiations "signifi-

'.
'

.

~ I

-6-

cantly altered

the

'total mix' of information made available."

"When a company whose stock is publicly traded makes a statement,
as Basic did, that "no negotiations' are underway, and that the
corporation knows o f
information

concerning

material by virtue of

'no reason for
ongoing
the

the stock's a ctivity'

acquisition

discussions

statement denying

their

becomes

existence."

Petn App 13a (emphasis in original).
CA6 acknowledged its disposition of the rna ter ial i ty issue
.....__
-conflicted with CA3's decision in Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc.,
742 F.2d 751 (CA3 1984), cert. denied, 105 s.ct. 1189 (1985).
similar

On

facts , vCA3 held that a company, which was involved in

merger negotiations, did not make a false or misleading statement
when it disclosed that it was unaware of any reason for the unusual

activity

in

its stock.

CA3 reasoned that the company's

mangagement "clearly knew of information that might have accounted for the increase in trading," id., at 759, but held that the
statement was not misleading because the merger discussions were
not material, and failure to disclose them could not, therefore,

.

be an omission of material fact.
As to the class certification issue, the court, noting that
reliance is an essential element of a lOb-S action that establishes

the causal nexus between the defendant's misconduct and

the plaintiff's injury, endorsed the de's application of a presumption of reliance.

~

difficult,

if

not

23 (b) (3) 's

requirement

Without such a presumption,

impossible,

satisfy

that members of

questions of law or fact

...

to

Fed.

R.

it would be
Civ.

Proc.

a putative class

share

in common that predominate over ques-

~

-7tions affecting only individual members.

CA6 noted that courts

have applied a presumption of reliance in cases that involve material misrepresentations that distort the price of stock on the
impersonal

market--the

so-called

"fraud on

the market

theory."

The theory has been consistently applied in this context.

See,

e.g., Lipton v. Documation, Inc., 734 F.2d 740 (CAll 1984), cert.
denied,
Cobb,

105 S.Ct.

Oklahoma

1983),

cert.

814

(1985);

T.J.

&

Irrigation Fuel Authority,

denied,

465

u.s.

1026

triggered by proving five elements:
lic misrepresentations;
(3)

Raney

Sons,

717

(1984).

Inc.

F.2d

v.

1330

Fort
(CAlO

The presumption

is

( 1) the defendants made pub-

(2) the misrepresentations were material;

the stock was traded on an efficient market;

(4)

the misrep-

resentations would induce a reasonable, relying investor to misjudge the value of the stock; and (5) the plaintiff traded in the
stock between the time the misrepresentations were made and the
time

the

truth

was

revealed.

CA6 determined

resps established

the threshold facts for proving their losses.
3.
resolve

CONTENTIONS:
the

Petrs argue that cert should be granted to

conflict with Greenfield.

The

financial

community

needs a clear rule governing a company's obligation to disclose
preliminary
trading

contacts

activity

developments"

regarding

occurs.

a

CA6's

possible
decision

merger
that

a

when

unusual

"no corporate

statement is a material omission when merger dis-

cussions are occurring,

even

if the discussions might not have

been material in the absence of the denial, improperly collapses
the

"materiality"

requirement.

requirement

into

the

"false

and

misleading"

The proper approach is to analyze whether the merg-

-8er negotiations, at the time of the statement, had progressed to
the point

that

it was likely that the merger would occur.

CA6

failed to apply properly the materia l ity test of TSC Industries.
Under this test, both CA2 and CA3 have held that failure to disclose

preliminary

merger

contacts

is

not

a

material

omission.

Here, by creating a standard that deems material any information
relating

to preliminary merger

contacts,

CA6

ignores

the plain

language of TSC Industries: information is material only if there
is "a substantial likelihood that,
the omitted

under all the circumstances,

fact would have assumed actual significance

deliberations of the reasonable shareholder."

426

u.s.,

in the

at 449.

Petrs contend that the use of a presumption of reliance in
class certifications presents an important issue that this Court
should address.
generally
States,

cite

406

u.s.

Courts that permit such use of presumed reliance
as

authority

128

(1972).

Affiliated Ute

Citizens

v.

United

But that case didn't involve class

certifications, and, in any event, it merely stands for the proposition that in cases of material nondisclosures reliance may be
presumed.

That proposition is inapplicable to the situation here

that involves an allegation of misleading disclosures.
more,

a presumption of reliance

should not be applied to resps

who were sellers, not buyers, of securities.
are

Further-

Decisions to sell

likely to be highly individualized and rpay not necessarily

depend heavily on the market price of the stock.

It is unreason-

able to assume here that class members sold their stock in reliance upon petrs' "no corporate development" statements.

-9Resps contend that the materiality inquiry involves a factspecific
Court.
per

analysis

that

does

Contrary to petrs'

se

rule

that

not

merit

assertions,

plenary

review

by

this

CA6 did not establish a

all preliminary merger contacts are materia l.

CA6 merely decided,

in explicit reliance on TSC Industries, that

on the facts of this case, petrs' false and misleading statements
were material as a matter of law.
CA6' s

decision does

not directly conf 1 ict with Greenfield.

It is true, resps argue, that the Greenfield majority employed an
unreasonably narrow reading of the company's "no corporate development"

statement that disregarded the meaning a reasonable

vestor would attach to the statement.

in-

The critical point, howev-

er, is that Greenfield held only that the statement was not false
or misleading,

not

that

it was

immaterial.

Hence,

there is no

direct conflict.
Resps note that the SEC,
opposed

the

de's

holding

appearing as amicus curiae below,

that

false

and

misleading

statements

about merger discussions do not become material until an agreement in principle between the parties is reasonably certain.
also In

re Carnation Co.,

Sec. L. Rep.
that

there

Sec.

Exch.

Act Rel.

(CCH) ,183,801 (July 8, 1985)
is

no corporate development

unusual market activity

in

No.

22214,

See
Fed.

(" [A]n issuer statement

that would

account

its stock, made while the issuer

for
is

engaged in acquisition discussions, may be materially false and
misleading.").
As

to the presumption of

reliance,

circuits have now approved its use

resps point out that 6

in securities fraud actions.

-10-

Resp Opp.

26

(citing cases).

There is no legal authority for

petrs' argument that the fraud on the
cable to sellers of securities.

market theory is inappli-

It is clear that material public

rni srepresen tat ions can cause a deflation of stock prices in an
efficient market, thereby harming those that sell.
4.

DISCUSSION:

1. This decision conflicts with Greenfield.

It is true that in a technical sense the holding in Greenfield
can be construed narrowly to be only that the statement involved
there was not false, inaccurate, or misleading.
one can argue,

as resps do,

Viewed as such,

that the is sue of rna ter i ali ty was

never reached by the Greenfield court.

I find this argument un-

persuasive as it overlooks the underlying premise of Greenfield's

~ because

the merger agreement had not been sufficiently (

finalized, the discussions relating to a possible merger were not
material and the company therefore had no duty to disclose them.
CA3 thus implicitly rejected the rationale of CA6 here: the duty
to disclose

information 'about the merger discussions arose not

because the information itself was material, but because the cornpany voluntarily chose

to disclose some information related to

the negotiations.
2. Resps are correct in arguing that CA6 did not adopt
se rule that all pre-merger contacts are material.

a~

CA6 analyzed

the petrs' statements with specific reference to the materiality
standards set forth in TSC Industries.
3. There are no inter-circuit conflicts with respect to the
presumption of reliance issue.

Petrs' argument that for purposes

of class certification, reliance shouldn't be presumed in cases

-11involving

allegations of

false or misleading statements doesn't

seem particularly persuasive.

In any event, this case can easily

be viewed as a failure to disclose case,

in which the rationale

of Affiliated Ute applies with full force.
4. The materiality issue is an important one that will un->---

doubtedly recur.

Resps assert that the SEC has taken the posi-

tion that Greenfield was wrongly decided, and language from In re
Carnation, supra, suggests resps are correct.

For these reasons,

in addition to the conflict with CA3, I recommend that the Court

~
5.
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